spinoza's ethics, prop xxxiii
Prop XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained.
[…]
I confess, that the theory which subjects all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that they are dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all things with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar, or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of their existence. I need, therefore, spend no more time in refuting such wild theories.
Spinoza, the Ethics, Concerning God, Proposition XXXIII and accompanying note. (Translation by R.H.M Elwes)
What’s at stake in the assertion that things could not be any other way than how they are? To imagine the world as one possibility among others is to foreground it as a sort of positive “shape” standing out against the background or “negative space” of pure possibility. When we eliminate the background, the world loses its shape; it has no more edges or absolute boundaries. Moreover, I must admit that I am “within” this world, or that I am an integral and inextricable part of it, and that it is no more possible for me to step outside of it and see it from afar than it is for me to step outside of my own body. Or if I do see it from afar, then I am precisely that world gazing upon itself.
As the illusion of background recedes, what was formerly the foreground hardens -- infinitely, absolutely. To feel the force of this, it is perhaps not ridiculous to try the following: grasp any small object and consider that it would have been impossible for this object to be any different than it is right now. If it is scratched or dented, every scratch and every dent is as much an integral and inevitable part of the universe as the law of gravity itself. If it is painted, it could not have been painted any other color. While Spinoza may be perfectly at home with such meditations, the insistence of the question of why (why these dents and scratches, but no others? why this color and not another? why something instead of nothing?) may increase in direct proportion to the petrifaction of the existent such that, at the limit, the question becomes the endlessly permeable material from the which the world’s inevitability has been fashioned.

