the western enlightenment isn't an ideology
In my typically naive yet heavy-handed way, I proclaim:
The Western Enlightenment is not one ideology among others but rather the historical condition which makes it possible to speak of ideologies in the first place.
No longer must those of us who defend such Enlightenment values as democracy and human rights be accused of hypocrisy when we condemn the destructiveness of ideological fervor! (And we often are accused of such hypocrisy -- e.g., "how can you say everyone has a right to practice their own religion on the one hand while, on the other hand, condemning the subjugation of women as a backward and immoral aspect of certain religions?") To answer that "we oppose any ideology which contradicts Enlightenment values" is NOT to admit defeat, is NOT to admit that we're just clubbing everyone over the head with our own version of ideology -- because Enlightenment values are not ideological.
38 Comments:
I don't think this proclamation can be sustained, Jay. The fact that what makes a lot of women miserable in some foreign country is OBVIOUS to us here in the West does not make us more enlightened. We simply can't see what makes a lot of women miserable in our own neighbourhoods. Our ideology amounts to historical conditions that make it easy to speak of one kind of subjugation (a veil) and impossible to speak about another (a miniskirt); there are other ideologies that find it as easy to identify our women as whores as it is difficult to see their women as victims (as we do). Note that this isn't just men talking about women. It's about as hard to admit you're a cheap slut as it is to admit you're a sad victim. And it's of course roughly as accurate a way of putting things. That's ideology for you.
Thanks for the comment, Thomas.
The point, I think, is not so much that our ideologies don't subjugate whole classes of people -- this would be a blatantly false claim -- but rather that we are at least able to have a conversation about what does or doesn't constitute an oppressive ideology or ideological practice. I suppose my claim, in this sense, is that the Enlightenment is the historical condition making such a conversation possible in the first place.
Yes, but I think that an ideology always needs to be able to articulate the (allegedly wrongheaded) values of the competing ideology. This what is sometimes called "othering". So Taoists need to be able to ridicule Confucians and vice versa, Catholics need to be able discuss Protestantism, etc. My point is that comparitive ideology is part of ideology itself, and that this always involves characterising our own ideology as "not ideological", meaning only that ours sets the standard for what we're going to say about the other guys. The part of your proclamation that I don't agree with is the one that makes us (the West) appear especially "conversant" about values, when it seems to me that, e.g., on the question of how to have women around in the community, non-Western ideologies are pretty articulate also about the competing (Western and non-Western) projects. Maybe you're just reproducing the myth that, first, non-Western societies don't recognize the insincerity of our values and, two, that this is because they are much more sincere about their own values than we are about ours. My guess is that we pass too quickly from "they don't reflect on issue X as we do" to "they are incapable of reflection". And I am assuming that the historical conditions you are talking about are precisely those that allow for ideological reflection.
My opinion on this issue (and perhaps that's what you meant when you said "Enlightenment values are not ideological") is that the most important value of Enlightenment should be considered - first and before everything else - a method of thinking. The rejection of dogmas and of any position deemed as absolute without evidence. Only by maintaing an unfaltering awareness of the importance of rigorous thinking is there a possibility of mining the bases of gratuitousness, and reveal the grotesque and pathetic pretensions of truth.
I think Joe's version of Jay's position is probably right. But it doesn't obviate the circularity Jay started by proclaiming himself free of. In order to reject dogmas, which I take to mean that we reject specific dogmas (about, e.g., how women should dress) not dogmatism in general (which is a bit too easy), then we have to be able to identify them, and to identify them as dogmas. I simply don't think we can do that without being dogmatic ourselves.
What I mean is: the rejection of "any position deemed as absolute without evidence", that is, of "truth" without "thinking", depends upon the rejector deeming, without evidence (since what would count as evidence of the absoluteness of another's beliefs?) and without thinking (since what are we to think?) that it is true that someone else adheres absolutely to dogma. This, it seems to me, means that in order to condemn specific instances of ideological subjugation we have to be ideological.
And my suggestion is that we stop condemning people for the ideologies they happen to be subject to, and start condemning them for the way they in fact treat people. And that standard then also applies to us.
Perhaps if instead of dogmas or dogmatism I used "metaphysics" it would have been somewhat clearer. Let me re-formulate my previous statement then.
The true spirit of Enlightenment should be the rejection of any metaphysics or absolutes. It should reveal the human origin of any assumption, law, or sets of values (ideology).
This means stating clearly that whoever believes in, or imposes, or enforces, a given ideology does not draw his views from a metaphysical principle or truth possessed in an exclusive way. No truth and no power have a justification, a form of metaphysical anchor to which they are attached. They are simply the contingent and always prefectible, result of a human history.
Of course, Thomas may argue, even this way of presenting reality (Nietzschean indeed) could be considered an ideology. It may appear so. But I see it rather as a method to identify, or remind of, presumptions of absolutes. A way to encourage people to see values and prescriptions for what they are, in their poor, human and contingent origin.
If, by hypothesis, all the people in the world instantly became aware that the ideological or religious precepts and rules don't have any true absolute reason to be, but are simply the contingent outcome of a given historical evolution at a given latitude, much of the (ideological) power enforced in the world would be eroded by ridicule. People would discuss and question more, likely. If this happened, positive laws would perhaps be closer to a 'social pact' rather than embody the legacy of old privileges or arbitrary ways of thinking.
Is this an ideology? I don't think so. It is a method of restraining presumptions, and revealing arbitrariness and logic of power, where others see absolute certainties.
This reasoning in my opinion would be very actual in the United States where - and we are not talking about Iran - large masses of people think politics should more or less literally comply with the Bible.
I suppose I think ideology is a red herring. There have always been ideologies (historical conditions that facilitate the expression of some ideas and inhibit the expression of others) and each of them has always been one among others. There is nothing exceptional about the ideology of the Enlightenment in this regard (which is the point of Jay's post that stuck in my craw). Or that, in any case, is what I have been trying to show.
Yes, I'd say the view Joe is expressing is both ideological and metaphysical and even vaguely absolutist. The human duty to think is presented unquestionable on his approach.
What Joe and Jay seem to forget is that everyone is really just doing their best to express themselves under the historical circumstances, and to figure out what is right to do, more or less aware of their limitations. Instead of believing we can plumb the depths of their metaphysics, or our own, I think we should "stop bravely at the surface" as Nietzsche proposed, and object to, oppose and occasionally combat the stuff that is palpably going on, rather than the alleged certainties that allegedly make it possible.
The effort to ground a critique of metaphysics in the contingency of history in order to object to everything from veils (in Afghanistan) to capital punishment (in Texas) seems to me to be a long way to go to make a pretty straightforward, if controversial, moral claim.
Ideologies, like religions, are subtended by fear and trembling. One takes the child to the mountain or to the ocean because the god must have blood, but there is not the man of faith who doen't consider the possibility that he has misunderstood what the god was trying to say. Likewise, Enlightenment ideologues must now and then suspect that thinking itself is an instrument of reaction. All the while pacing out the trail to Moria.
Thomas writes:
"What Joe and Jay seem to forget is that everyone is really just doing their best to express themselves under the historical circumstances, and to figure out what is right to do, more or less aware of their limitations."
I might be wrong, but it seems to me that Thomas shows a 'faith' in history as a manifestation of the best world possible, as the outcome of a chain of necessity. This reasoning has dangers. It can give way to forms of quietism.
Also, I also find the conclusion of the comment a bit singular. Thomas writes:
"but there is not the man of faith who doen't consider the possibility that he has misunderstood what the god was trying to say."
How often are religious people prepared to pursue a path of doubt and questioning, to the extreme?
Inasmuch as the religious person has a 'faith' (in most cases passively acquired through upbringing) which places itself beyond rational inquiry, doubt will be - at best - like a gentle touch of a pin that never enters the flesh. In most cases, religion is not embraced as a result of an inquiry, rather to prevent it. To wrap oneself in the warm, comforting embrace of pre-existing certainties, without facing the anguish of not knowing and pursuing.
Surely any ideology has dangers of becoming a 'faith'. But I would not consider religion as comparable to the values of Enlightenment in this respect. They are exactly the opposite. Religion wallows in metaphysics and a priori thinking, while the values of enlightenment are not compatible with such an approach.
One speaks of angels and trinities, the other says we cannot speak of what we don't know. The latter is a lesson never learned enough, and still too foreign to our world.
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Maybe my difficulty with Jay's post is simply the interest in condemning something like the subjugation of women as an aspect of certain religions (or ideologies). Why not just condemn the subjugation of women? Why this need to attach unjust practices to "backward and immoral" ideologies? Why this shift of focus to matters that are finally, as Joe has noted, of metaphysical interest only?
I can be as despairing about history as the next guy. But what I find especially hopeless is the effort to engage with the phantasms - our phantasms - of other people's beliefs when their actions are right there out in the open, just as ours are, ready to be compared, contrasted, defended, denounced etc. The problem with this Enlightenment line you're pushing is that it amounts simply to idea that our reasons to mistreat women are better than their reasons.
The critique of ideology deters (or at least distracts us from) real political debate. Why say "You only believe women should be treated this way because the Bible tells you so and that's foolish!" when we can say, "You think we should treat women this way; I think we should treat them this other way."
I'll grant there's a danger of quietism lurking somewhere in my view of history (but the point of course is that this is only the best of all possible worlds so long as everyone, including yours truly, is "doing the best they can".) The danger implicit in the slogan "Enlightenment values are not ideological" is somewhat different. I remember once refusing to put my name on an email petition about the Taliban situation in Afghanistan when they took over. I think the ease with which we finally allowed Bush & Co. to smash that country to bits somehow bears me out. Many of my friends sincerely thought we (the West) were justifiably bombing the hell out of an immoral and backward religion.
"Maybe my difficulty with Jay's post is simply the interest in condemning something like the subjugation of women as an aspect of certain religions (or ideologies). Why not just condemn the subjugation of women? Why this need to attach unjust practices to "backward and immoral" ideologies?"
I have read that in August a sixteen years old girl was executed in Iran for 'behaviours not compatible with chastity'. To any western observer I believe this fact cannot fail to be perceived with intense dismay and even indignation (even if I suspect that some righteous Christian fundamentalists might perceive the execution of the girl as a simple excess of zeal!). One could - as Thomas suggests - concentrate on the mere fact that the execution of the girl reveals a barbarian denial of the fundamental rights of the individual. One might even avoid 'attaching' the execution of the girl to a given religion (Islam), because - after all - religions evolve, just like the interpretation of religious texts, and there are differences from country to country. Moreover, even Christians have executed people in the most barbarian ways in the Middle Ages, but things have changed (even if, be that said incidentally, the sub-culture of lynching and capital punishment in America could be seen as ideologically associated to the eye-for-eye biblical notion). So perhaps, following Thomas train of thought, we could exert political and cultural pressure, avoiding the total condemnation of given religions (which could be perceived as disrespect of entire countries).
But when dealing with these matters, there comes a moment in which one realizes that the origin of the problem of religion-backed injustice and intolerance is exactly associated to the metaphysical presumption of which religion is imbued. When some tenets are deemed as absolutely and unobjectionably true with no necessity of evidence, claiming that those tenets should become normative elements in our society appears consequential. Just like, for fundamentalists, considering those who don't agree as 'despicable supporters of Satan who will burn in hell'. And this is *exactly* why the value of Enlightenment are of fundamental importance, as they can provide a common thinking framework to discriminate acceptable tenets from dangerous arbitrariness, and to prevent irrationality and intolerance. And the way I see it, this concerns a lot not only Islam countries but America too!
I believe that a country where 68% of the population believes in the devil, 48% in creationism and 28% in evolution (Gallup survey), needs to seriously sort out what can be deemed as acceptable knowledge and what can be deemed as 'religious' (thus not pertaining to the plane of knowledge or laws).
We can avoid condemning a given religion. But we cannot avoid condemning the metaphysical presumption of religion when it is claimed that its tenets be considered acceptable content in the plane of common discourse, knowledge and legislation. Unfortunately, I see a massive confusion in this respect in the the United States: prayers at the White House, the president claiming to be told by God that a war is right, lots of God talking by politicians, creationism put on the same level of evolution, a discourse on sexual ethics that is closely connected with religious presumptions. A general blurring of secular speech into religious speech and viceversa, whereas the two realms should be clearly (or we could say inexorably) marked as distinct. As it is, America gives an example of fundamentalism to the world, just like Iran.
A clearer measure is needed to discriminate bogus from non-bogus in the planes of knowledge, education, legislation, and public discourse, letb alone simple thinking. The import and de facto political acceptance of religious and ideological tenets must be completely eradicated, and this can be accomplished by utilizing a common measure of discernment, that provided by the values of Enlightenment, which is also the spirit of the American Constitution. Religious people, believers in witchcraft, voodoo, animal spirits, holy spirits, trinities and virgin mothers can of course continue to believe in what they want. But in the quiteness of their homes, and possibly well aware that some categories of thought will not be shared by everybody. It must finally become imperatively present to everyone that religious and ideological speech must not ever be confused with public speech, but is something acceptable only at private level. As it is, not only is the confusion present but appears to be increasing in the United States, in this much unlike Europe.
The challenges posed by a multi-ethnical and multi-cultural world can more effectively be sustained if the values of Enlightenment and of generally recognized civil rights are considered a common, unifying set of values. On an international level (since it has been mentioned), every country has sovereignty. But the world is entitled to, and should, exert pressure on particularly odious regimes (just like, in the past, pressure was exerted on South Africa). Which does not mean that a self-appointed superhero-country should 'bomb the hell of a nation' as a first resort, and against international laws.
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I don't think it's any use to distinguish between religion and its metaphysical presumptions. Religion is a system of metaphysical presumption. So is Enlightenment and that's what makes it an ideology.
I'm content for the moment to point out that the purportedly non-ideological Enlightenment project, as Joe pitches it, is consistent with "exerting presure" on "odious regimes" that "dismay" us until their metaphysics are "completely eradicated". Once all that rhetoric is safely in place and brought resolutely to bear on some poor girl in Iran, you can bet that the very same sort of people who threw the first stones at her, will be ready to dispatch one or another form of Enduring Freedom on their backwards asses. (And you can be sure they'll have their own special non-ideological reasons to do so.) What these sorts of people have in common are the stones; some people got stones to throw and a clear shot, others are less privileged.
The other stuff about sequestering weird beliefs in people's homes seems like the sort of weird belief that ought to be sequestered in someone's home. Obviously the kinds of things fundamentalists (whether Christian, Islamic or Enlightened) would have women endure should be talked about in public.
As a religious woman (though not a fundamentalist), I find this conversation really interesting.
When Thomas stated in one of his comments "Why not just condemn the subjugation of women? Why this need to attach unjust practices to 'backward and immoral' ideologies?" - it appeared to me that he was making a case of the necessity of condemning the subjugation of women without attaching the whole matter to ideology. I am not sure if he meant it so, though, at this point.
In my previous comment I have been trying to say that when we are faced with behaviours that appear patently unjust, infringing the most elementary rights of people; when masses of people - not necessarily in Iran, also in the United States (!) - are subject to (or risk to be subject to) an arrogant power with the pretension of drawing legitimacy from God and universal truths from religious dogmas, an furthermore possibly attempting to legislate consequently; when there is a situation in which the tenets of science are confused with those of religion, with the possibility of this situation becoming worse and worse; in all the above cases, and many others, we can concentrate on single practical issues, but we cannot fail to see that those issues are often engaged with a problem of knowledge, or to what I have called "metaphysical presumptions".
The acknowledgement of this latter aspect does not automatically entail a political action, or bombing 'anybody's ass'. But the central problem is: do we think that any notion is admissible and equal? Suppose that a majority of Americans decided that "we have had enough with science and rationalism, we should just study the Bible, because everything that deserves to be known in science and ethics is contained in the book the Almighty gracefully delivered to us", would that be fine? Is the will of the majority the only consideration that matters? Should we refrain from trying to define what is acceptable or not in knowledge? I don't think so. And I think science already operates using certain standards. But I detect attempts in the United States of subjecting science to ideological and religious agendas. And religion is a constant factor of confusion and arbitrariness.
Now, when Thomas equates religion to Enlightenment, he appears to dangerously renounce a possibility of discernment. Religion and Enlightenment cannot be equated because while the former blithefully does without any evidence, the latter thinks that superstition and unfounded assumptions must be rejected. Mind you, rational thinking is not totally foreign to religions either, but religions extoll the idea of mystery and the subjugation of the intellect to dogmas. Ignatius Loyola (quoted by Camus) claims that the "sacrifice of the intellect" is the one in which God most rejoices! Obviously such a statement reveals the fundamental antinomy between rational thinking and religion.
Shall we, in the Western world, refrain from establishing a measure or a method of thinking? Everything goes? Perhaps, from now on, if some biology book reports that the Earth is 6000 years old 'as per Bible', that will be fine? I don't think so. And the reason is a legacy of the Enlightenment which suggests a method of rigorous thinking. Rigorous thinking, and the idea that statements should be proved, appear to me a quite basic requirement of logical thinking, not an ideology.
All the above to me is of central importance and should be said clearly, without hesitation. Or should one appear hesitant to appear graceful towards the contrivances of religion? I don't think so.
This said, the problem is twofold: cultural and political. Of knowledge and of action. The unfaltering belief in rigorous thinking, and welcoming only statements with evidence, does not automatically entail that one should bomb anybody. There is a whole range of actions, on a cultural level, that can be carried out: spreading culture and science, increasing contacts and exchanges. On an international level, there might be cases in which the international community as a whole (not a single self-appointed global policeman) might deem that actions should be taken - in a gradual fashion - to stop particularly odious situations. Using diplomacy first, and then carefully devised means of economical pressure, and finally, only as a last resort, by intervening with an internationally legitimated military force.
In conclusion, I think there is no doubt on the fact that the values of Enlightenment, culture, science and rationality are the most democratic values that can be shared in the world. They don't say: "this is is right because I say it". They say: "this is right because you too can find the evidence for this".
These values truly work toward the 'eradication' of arbitrary assumptions and arrogance.
Thanks, Joe and Thomas, for the great discussion! I've wanted to jump in at several points, but work and toothache have kept me quiet so far.
I think that my position remains closer to Joe's when Joe suggests that the Enlighten provides a “common thinking framework".
When Thomas asks
Why say "You only believe women should be treated this way because the Bible tells you so and that's foolish!" when we can say, "You think we should treat women this way; I think we should treat them this other way."
he presupposes that there is enough common ground (the logical structure of language, perhaps) to hold this conversation -- as a meaningful conversation, as a conversation in which each party risks the possibility of transforming its position -- in the first place. I'm not sure that one can take this common ground for granted. The reply to Thomas' well-meaning interlocutor may very well be "Ok, think whatever you want. It makes no difference to me. I don't have to answer to you or to your feelings about how we treat women. There's only one authority I ever answer to and that authority is God/tradition/the Bible/myself/our leader/our political manifesto/this set of teachings/etc. And this authority says that I am treating women exactly as they should be treated. Your pathetic concerns about whatever it is you call 'fairness' mean absolutely nothing to me." The content of American conservative talk radio strikes me, in fact, as little more than variation upon variation of this very claim.
Naive liberal caller: But you're not being fair . . .
Talk show host: So? I'm right. I don't have to be fair.
Early on in the discussion, Thomas brings up the notion of "ideological reflection". I'm not sure that I believe in such a notion, and I suppose this is where my disagreement with Thomas really lies. It seems to me that the degree to which someone speaks from an ideological perspective is precisely the degree to which that someone is incapable of recognizing that speech as ideological. Ok, now was that last sentence just spoken from an ideological perspective or not? I would, of course say no, and I'll offer the following as one possible defense. It seems to me that the Enlightenment notions are devoid of positive content in way that ideologies simply aren't. One of the forms of Kant's categorical imperative, for example, tells us to treat others as ends in themselves, never as means to ends; what it looks like to actually do this isn't specified. Ideologies, on the other hand, are all about the specifics: women should wear veils, marriage is between one man and one woman, the pledge of allegiance should be recited at the beginning of each schoolday.
I believe my original post may have been careless in two ways. "Condemn" was probably too violent of a word. Enlightenment doesn't spread by means of bombs; it spreads by means of bringing the other into conversation, by means of friendship. And in my rush to defend the Western Enlightenment I may have implied that the West and only the West is, has been, or ever could be enlightened. I do think enlightenment of a sort happened here in the west, but I didn't mean to imply that enlightenment is special state of being which can only originate in the west. (Nor did I mean to suggest that the West, having pass through the Enlightenment, is now free of ideology).
Finally, while I agree with many of Joe's points, I don't agree that religion or metaphysics is always the problem. Ideologies can be purely (or even just primarily) political, ethnic, nationalistic, and so on.
While I'm getting my arguments neatly lined up, note the following curious remarks of Jay's:
"It seems to me that the degree to which someone speaks from an ideological perspective is precisely the degree to which that someone is incapable of recognizing that speech as ideological." (From his last post)
"Enlightenment values are not ideological." (From his first post.)
QED, I want to say. My belief in common ground, like my faith in history, is intermittent. My point here is just that the Enlightenment ideologue has metaphysical presumptions just like everyone else, and this presumption is ideological precisely, as Jay says, because it denies its ideological character.
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I knew you'd try to get me there, Thomas! :) Which is one of the reasons I made the negative-vs-positive content distinction. For what it's worth, I had originally included the following bolded text in my post:
It seems to me that the degree to which someone speaks from an ideological perspective is precisely the degree to which that someone is incapable of recognizing that speech as ideological. Ok, now was that sentence just spoken from an ideological perspective or not? If it was, does it prove itself? But if it proves itself, then is it really ideological?
Yes, that may have been a bit unfair of me. Let me think about that positive/negative distinction for a bit.
Jay, are you suggesting that there is no enlightenment value about, specifically, how to treat women? I.e., that the only thing that might be wrong with the subjugation of women is the sense in which it violates (not the woman) but the categorical imperative?
Is the reminder of the need of using founded, rational and logical propositions (and the use of such propositions) ideological?
Is language ideological?
Is it ideological to state that saying "in order to dry yourself you should take a shower?" is a nonsense?
I really can't see how one can define as ideological the simple reminder of the necessity to use our own reason, and thus speech, properly. And, consequently, the necessity to reject unfounded notions or reveal their arbitrary origin.
After all, thought and language already embody a rational logic, only they are also sometimes used as a vehicle of unfounded notions. Is it really so bad to hope that one can clearly discriminate between rationality/evidence and irrationality/ungrounded claims?
Frankly, to me Englightenment resembles a tautology more than an ideology. Only, a necessary tautology.
My insistence on religion and metaphysics has to do with a simple fact: Enlightenment represented the emergence of a new awareness, that of rejecting arbitrariness and superstition and that of basing propositions upon rational evidence. To the extent in which religion is accepted, it acts as a factor of irrationality which tends to shun rational objections and appeal to higher, if ungrounded, reasons ("it's God's will", "the Bible says so, and the Bible is the voice of God" etc.) or to a priori thinking. One cannot fail to see the impact that such an approach has on the planes of politics, ethics, and knowledge.
Yes, I think I see what the trouble is. Jay started with a notion of "Enlightenment values" that seemed to include specific prescriptions that counter the specific prescriptions of other ideologies. I read "the subjugation of women" and pictures of veils and skirts filled my head. But the real beef you guys have with these specifics is that they are only possible, in general, because people don't think for themselves. "Do your own thinking" becomes the core Enlightenment value.
At one level Joe and I are of course in agreement. The value of thinking things through for yourself is obvious to me also, and do it as often as I can. I don't, however, believe my powers of intellection to be absolute. Indeed, ideologies and metaphysics have to do limits to what can be thought, and I agree with Jay that there is something historical about those limits. If Joe's point emerges from the observation of a "simple fact", mine emerges from an awareness of a very complex set of relations.
If we compare what happens to some 16 year old boys who display "behaviour consistent with the intent to traffic" in the US, with what happens to some 16 year old girls in Iran who display "behaviour inconsistent with chastity", and especially if we try seriously to understand what determines the function of the qualifying clause "some" and its implicature "not all", we will begin to understand that ideology is not the cause of the practices we want to condemn. Nor is the problem that people don't want to think. The problem is historical and temperal in a sense that we're all to familiar with: Who the hell's got time to think. The conditions that make it possible are what I'm concerned about.
Lastly, I have been trying to defend religious people (on the model of religious people I have known and religious people I have been) from the charge that their faith is an obvious indication of their simplicity of mind. The concept of God is a piece of metaphysical parsimony. In most situations, it's perfectly justified as part of your ontology.
Just a quick couple of comments and then I'm off to bed . . .
Joe, you mention religion acting as "a factor of irrationality which tends to shun rational objections . . ." What's the source of this dynamic? Is it really religious belief per se? Or is it a kind of primordial coercion? I'm thinking here of Hegel's Master/Slave dialectic which sets history in motion. The slave must act as if the master's being transcends him/her or constitutes ultimate reality, whereas a religious fundamentalist behaves as if a certain interpretation of scripture (called "literal") constitutes ultimate reality. Maybe I'm not stating this well, but I guess my point is that perhaps religious subjugation is itself a symptom of deeper tendency toward subjugation as such.
Thomas, I know and have known religious people who are also independent thinkers. To be perfectly frank, I am a bit jealous of them. For most of my adult life, until fairly recently (last couple of years), thinking has been a synonym for "not believing". Meeting others for whom this contradiction doesn't exist has started to change that for me, I think (which perhaps accounts for that line of thought concerning "infinity" awhile back and seems to have some connection to writing & reading poetry). Anyway, no conclusions to draw from this, but thought I would mention it . . .
In reply to Jay:
So, isn't the anguish that accompanies not knowing, and the associated awareness of one's ignorance, a drive to knowledge? And isn't religion - a lump of a priori thinking and superstition inherited from the past and forced, for the most part, on people since birth - a postiche set of notions, which tricks people into thinking that they know the most fundamental thing of all, that is the meaning of their life and of the universe? Aren't religious contrivances - cleverly exempted from evidence by virtue of their very equally contrived features - likely to paint a self-indulgent smile on the face of hordes of pious 'truth-seekers' who already think they possess the ultimate truth about life? And, by doing so, will the devout people not resemble the pavid walker who always shuns the path running along the brink of the precipice not to face its depth? Aren't religious fabrications - with their illegitimate status of truth - a hindrance to knowledge? Will they not lead people to avoid questions and anticipate unfounded answers?
I think we can clearly see how religion tends to either ignore, or twist and manipulate, evidence. Or to divert from the paths of research because of a priori thinking. It does not limit itself to stating the unfounded existence of a God (which would be already quite unacceptable from a gnoseological point of view), it draws all sorts of consequences from it. Of course it cannot claim anymore that the earth revolves around the sun. But a number of religious people blithely believe that the earth is 6000 years old (some studies are issued to tackle this aspect). It is also said that humans have a centrality on earth associated to eschatology, and all sorts of consequences are drawn related to sexuality, ethics and law. The confusion between scientific studies and religion is also clear as regards the discourse on evolution vs. creationism or as regards ideas on the origin of the universe. All this has a tremendous impact on people's life and on education, and reinforces pregiudice, intolerance, disinclination to free and open research. The whole idea of Enlightenment and scientific research is based on the rejection of ungrounded assumptions, and yet - with religion - an enormous streak of a priori thinking and structured irrationality (or socially-accepted psychosis) is allowed in the most natural way, shaping people's mind into wrong habits.
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Like I've been trying to say, religion is as often a context in which to deal with doubts about what it all means as it is a set of ready-made answers. It is by no means a lump. Or rather, it is no less lumpy than evolutionary theory, which is a ready-made answer for too many people I know and love too much to mention. The 6000 years that some creationists appeal to in order to get it all to make sense is really no less silly than the 4.5 billion years that evolutionists appeal to in order cast us into anguish and/or despair and/or freedom. 6000 years does not make anything more meaningful, just as 4.5 billion does not make anything less meaningful. Both figures a perfectly good backdrops against which to make sense of YOUR life, if you like that sort of thing, and depending on a number of historical contingencies. Note that different, but equally profound mysteries, portents, etc. seem to lurk in the fossil record on both accounts. And there is, I'm told, in any case a thorny problem within the sciences here: Geology gives the Earth 4.5 billion (or something on that order) years but biology needs good deal more time in order to explain the evolution of something as sophisticated as the human species through selection. Most evolutionary ideologues I know of have no idea what would count as evidence for their beliefs. They are about as sharp on the biological mechanism as most Bible-belt Christians are on, say, Greek philology. Nor do they really care very much about confronting the alternatives in any detail. It's hook, line and sinker in both camps, evidence exempted. Just a difference in style for the most part. Evidence. Ha! God gives us one self-indulgent smile and we paint ourselves another.
It seems to me that Thomas' conclusion appears to be, more or less, like saying: "Science is construction, religion is too. One or the other is the same, everything goes. It makes sense to chose the fabrication that makes us live better. Life is short, you guys, so whatever makes you happy, it's all good and cool." (why do I think of an underlying vocation to mystic contemplation?)
It is quite interesting to find such an approach in a thread on Enlightenment.
But Thomas seems to overlook some aspects that are by no means negligible. The theory of evolution does not have any claim of absoluteness, yet is not arbitrary and is the result of verifiable empirical investigation. It is not a dogma, and can be challenged by anybody, without risks of 'burning in hell' or by being hit by anathemas, unlike religious tenets deemed absolute and indubitable with no evidence.
Claiming that science and religion are on the same plane because of some alleged 'still unexplained' aspects is a bit like claiming that until we have total certainty of knowing everything about the weather and atmospheric agents we should keep believing in Zeus, Zephyrus, Eurus and so on.
I find the fact of substantially equating religion and science worrying. From now on, the religious rupture of some self-proclaimed God-ointed prophet shall be considered the same as substantiated studies on the various aspects of reality?
Mythology, religion, superstition, psychosis and science: all undistinguishable?
From now on, no difference between claims that are not founded (if not in a circular way) and conclusions drawn from evidence?
Why did people of Enlightenment bother?
There are all kinds of differences between the ideologies or systems of belief (systems of warrant, if you will) you mention, Joe. Of course there are. And I haven't been ignoring them. I have been pointing out that they are comparably "ideological" (this thread is as much about ideology as it is about Enlightment). I have been saying that you can be as lumpy and blithe about science as you can be about religion, and many are. You can, likewise, be sophisticated and thoughtful and interesting to talk to on a background of faith. (There are altogether realistic descriptions of hell, Joe, as many religious people who've been through it will tell you.) And faith as such does not lead directly to consequences that are any worse than Enlightenment "thinking". They do lead to different consequences, no question about that. But it seems to me to be an open question whether a religiously justified veil is more or less insane than a scientific miniskirt. Some people base their "scientific truths" on experience (what you call evidence) others base it on authority and paperback fictions (what I call ideology), some people base their "religious faith" on experience (what they call suffering) others base it on authority and pulp (what you call ideology.) But you can keep drawing a cartoon outline around my arguments and call me a fool if you like that sort of thing.
No, no cartoon. I simply think the equation religion = Enlightenment is quite a stretch. And I can't see how Enlightenment should be considered an ideology. Unless we concentrate on aspects that are not relevant, such as possible fanatism for example. What I am trying to say is that the most fundamental aspect of Enlightenment is a method, an approach, which is blithely ignored in religions.
I think if you replace Enlightenment with 'rigour of thought' and 'acceptance of doubt' or 'rejection of contrivances or dogmas', you will see that.
There is nothing in science that can be equated to, say, the idea of Trinity, Archangels and Virgin Maries, and to the pretension of a divine foundation of ethics or even of the idea of the human being.
If you equate religion to "Enlightenment", the very core of the values of Enlightenment is lost. And without being ideological, that is a regression.
While science bases its discourse on evidence, religion states its discourse on dogmas. Surely the association of suffering to religion cannot be compared to scientific evidence. When a righteous Christian states "thou shall..." in most case he will say, "because God said so", surely not "because I suffered" (which would not make it more sensible). Because "God say so"? Sorry, I don't think such a statement is comparable to those of science or even to plain rigorous ordinary thinking.
Shall one come out with a 'more powerful God' to counteract lack of rationality nowadays, or to object claims, instead of expecting a common ground of sense? Is that what everything boils down to in 2004? A clash of religions? A clash of different fashions of arbitrariness?
There are too many people who arrogantly claim to know what a God wants, and what's worse they claim their ideas should apply for everybody. Often they make disasters. The last one is called George W. And some Moslims do the same in their own way. Perhaps people slaughter each other for a disagreement on some scientific research, but that would not be the rule nowadays. Whereas religions has produced and still produces these type of results.
Let's take an example. There are obvious differences between prayer and inquiry, but if I'm right then both operations stand in a similar relation to the religious and scientific orthodoxies (ideologies) that frame them.
Scientific inquiry could not occur, nor could thinking in general, if we didn't start with some more or less well defined body of doctrine. You can call it theory if you like, but for most of your education, and most of your research carreer, and for all practical purposes, what "we already know" functions in scientific research as dogma.
Please keep in mind that religious dogmas are known to change. Part of my take on this consists in pointing out that if Joe was right, then such changes are inexplicable.
Now, the individual working scientist, while aware of the reigning orthodoxy that defines her field, will in most cases harbour unorthodox beliefs based on investigations that have not yet been examined by her peers (normally only in writing since replication of results is more myth than reality). She conducts her inquiries in order to figure out how to install them within the larger body of orthodoxy, i.e., "publish" them. If her results are interesting, something will have to give. Sometimes she discovers that she was wrong and the orthodoxy was right, and sometimes she discovers a clever way to preserve the larger mass or lump of dogma while making a small, elegant change. Thus her own "rigorous thinking" participates in a collective process of inquiry and the orthodoxy is transformed. But the great majority of people are either sheep or fanatics or blithely indifferent about the orthodoxy and have no understanding of the finer points of the inquiries that produce them.
The enormous difficulty, and moral suffering, of scientists, who must carefully choose their words in order not to be (often very quickly) deemed crackpots for even entertaining an unorthodox view is well documented (even in modern science) but often ignored in this type of discussion.
In a similar way, prayer sets up a relation between experience and scripture. The believer's personal experience, his suffering, is compared with the orthodox expression of his faith. Something's got to give, and the history of religion is the history of it not always being the believer's experience (or "evidence", if you will) that must be tossed out the window.
I think Joe's argument depends on ruling irrelevant any deviation from the (his) scientific "ideal" (zealotry, fanaticism, etc. become unscientific by definition) while committing religion to its most cartoonish facets. I think he is being unfair.
I am not equating science and religion, I am comparing them. Also, this discussion started because Jay wanted precisely for Enlightenment values to be legitmately imposed on others (i.e., others could be condemned for their deviation from them). He has, I note, now taken a more enlightened view of the matter.
PS. I think the cartoon aspect of Joe' argument comes through most clearly in his "because God said so" view of religious warrant. For those who are tempted to think of prayer as "asking God for stuff", which is also a cartoon of religious practice, they might consider how they would respond to having a critic of science take literally the slogan "putting questions to nature", which is a common way of pitching experimental inquiry to the masses. "You just ask Ma Nature what she's up to?" Of course not. Don't be silly.
One time a guy said that he thought science and religion are both based on belief, and thus science cannot claim to possess more truth than religion. He made an example, he said, more or less: "you believe that the chinese wall exists, but you have not actually seen it, thus your perception of reality is as much based on belief as that of a religious person." Of course this person did not consider the fact that if one goes to China, one can personally verify the existence of the chinese wall. He merely compared the existential datum of the way one relates to a notion to conclude that religion and science are the same.
For some reasons, the above argument comes to my mind when reading Thomas's view. Thomas compares science to religion in their relating to a set of pre-existing notions. He suggests that in both cases, at an individual level, there is a constant reference to a limiting orthodoxy, and that in both cases there's is a form of subjugation under the respective orthodoxy. He suggests that both in religion and in science "something's got to give", and that religious dogmas change while opposing resistance, just like scientific 'dogmas'.
The problem with this view is that - just like in the starting example - it focuses on the 'psychology' of the relation to given sets of notions and appears to suggest that religion and science are comparable only by virtue of the psychological dynamic involved, claimed as similar.
But just like in the starting example, while one can verify each single step that led to current scientific notions by repeating experiments and redrawing the same conclusions, the same cannot be said of religion. Religion is based on a primary dogma held without proof: the existence of God, the numerous other dogmas religion draw sustainment from this primary unfounded claim.
I find it misleading, if not sophistic, to equate the mechanisms that operate at an individual psychological level respecting a set of pre-existing notions, without tackling the substance of the notions involved and the way they have originated, and without considering that even if some religious dogmas change (but others keep being added, Catholics added a dogma on the Virgin Mary in 1950, on her "Assumption"), it is the way such dogmas are formulated that is objectionable and the fact that the fundamental dogmas of religion never had any proof whatsoever.
I think one ought to concentrate on the difference between religion and science exactly with respect to the ways the notions originated and are elaborated: fancifully on one side, and through universally verifiable and repeatable experience (but no claim of absolute) on the other side.
Religion is sustained by fantasy and contrivances (though it claims to possess absolute truth); its propensity to cling on fantasy started in ancient times when people still groped in total lack of knowledge, and still needed to fill the gaps in any possible way, even by inventing mythologies. Unfortunately such propensity has remained as a sticky mental habit.
It is exactly this mental habit, legacy of a remote past, that is deemed as wrong by the values of Enlightenment. But it is not a matter of ideology, it is a matter of method of thought and method of elaborating knowledge. If one considers closely, religions started because people tried to give explanations. After thousands of years, the Enlightnment does not say that the desire of explanations was wrong, rather the fact of accepting explanations that had no proof, and what's worse, to allow their becoming 'normative' or part of the vision of reality, and perpetuating them, with their prejudice and arbitrariness.
The Enlightment responds to the need of clearly establishing acceptable criteria of thought and elaboration of knowledge, and discriminating between arbitrary and non-arbitrary statements. That is why I don't agree with the concept of Enlightenment as ideology that can be equated to religion, a concept that appears misleading, if - perhaps - reassuring for religious people.
Notions like "blithe" and "self-indulgent" are in the realm of individual psychology. As is something like "reassurance". I've been pointing out that non-religious people are as good at affecting these poses as religious people are. Enlightenment is both an existential attitude and an ideology, and so is religion. Science, as a viable social practice, depends on fantasy and contrivance and it is simply not true that scientific theories are verifiable all the way down. Religious people, finally, are much less reassured than Joe claims.
In order to condemn other people for what they believe you've got to be pretty sure about the content of those beliefs. That assurance is the ideological moment of Jay's original post and Joe's subsequent remarks. But Joe simply doesn't know what religious people believe.
People who believe in God experience Him in their lives. It is just like having been to China and continuing to believe in the existence of the Great Wall. Or, which may be more to the point, it's like meeting someone who has seen the Great Wall and saying to oneself, "Yeah, that sounds plausible, and there seem to be many others who vouch for this. Maybe one day I'll go have a look for myself. For now I'll live my life as though the thing exists." There simply is such a thing as a religious experience.
I still see in Thomas a strong proclivity for equating the 'psychology' of science to the 'psychology' of religion in order to suggest that scientific notions can be equated to religious ones, and that the scientific method is an ideology just like religion.
Or, using Thomas' wording, that Enlightenment is just a existential possibility, just like religion. I think a fundamental point is missed: we are not talking about psychology or existential approaches, but we are talking about the valididy of notions. It seems that to Thomas 'everything goes', provided that some notions are 'existentially' backed.
A notion does not become valid because there is an underlying psychological need that sustains it, but because it can be verified.
Claiming that some notions are true with no need of proof is a door dangerously open to arbitrariness and superstition. And arbitrariness and superstition have a heinous effect in our society.
Considering Thomas' point, one should conclude that if a certain president affirms that God told him to start a war, no other reason is required and no 'casus belli': he can just go ahead, and surely all the people grown into religious thinking will understand him and won't ask any unnecessary logical or rational question. because, after all, faith has little to do with rationality. The best sacrifice in which God rejoices is that of intellect (Ignatius Loyola).
Also, frankly, if one were to meet thousands of people who believe in Zeus or in the Great Manitu, thinking "Yeah, that sounds plausible, and there seem to be many others who vouch for this. Maybe one day I'll go have a look for myself. For now I'll live my life as though the thing exists" (in Thomas' words) appears to be a bit foolish, and the typical mechanism through which superstition spreads.
People are certainly free to wallow in superstition, magic, religion, or voodoo trance. But cannot surely expect their claims to be considered not arbitrary and not a door wide open to irrationality, fanatism and intolerance.
There is a 'religious experience': in hundreds of forms, and in each case, huge crowds of people are fanatically convinced of being the privileged possessors of truth, exempted from proof. This type of thinking, resulting from the legacy of an obscure past of ignorance, collides with acceptable knowledge and proper elaboration of valid statements. It is a cause of division and intolerance and, what's worse, a cause of confusion between scientific, verifiable facts and fantasies from a remote past.
And, again, especting that proof should be given when people claim something as true, is an elementary rational requirement, not an ideology.
I was trying to point out that you construe religion as an individual psychological attitude (stupidity) and that you read various ideological facts off this attitude. If you replace "equate" with "compare" in your opening sentence (as I have already suggested) you are entirely right. I am "[comparing] the 'psychology' of science to the 'psychology' of religion in order to suggest that scientific notions can be [compared] to religious ones." But starting with the psychology of belief (blitheness and self-indulgence, the fear of anguish and the need for reassurance) was your idea, not mine. Reconstructing my argument properly, in these terms, I'd say that I'm suggesting that the psychological states (especially, respect for authority and tradition coupled with the decisive role of doubt) that are needed to practice science and to practice religion are comparable and, starting from this psychology, we can transfer the analogy to the "notions" or "ideas" that provide the cognitive framework for these psychological states. That is, we can compare ideologies. What turns out to be especially similar is the existential stance one has to take up between dogma and personal experience.
As for my strong proclivities for foolishness and dispensing with elementary rational principles, well, note that Zeus, by today's standards, is a pretty silly object of religious belief, and should probably be compared (vaguely) with a belief in phlogiston or the ether, which have not always been silly notions, but are now. The main point I was making went not to the plausibility of the view (it is easy to find implausible examples of both religious and scientific belief if you go into the past) but the attitude of maybe, one day, having a look for oneself. Which is really the best way to do metaphysics.
I personally don't have anything to object against the propensity of some individuals to engage in mysticism and/or meditations on the after-world, as portrayed by the Christian tradition. If they have an incontrollable drive in this respect, and they wish to pursue their visions, they should be allowed to express themselves. Just like I don't have anything against the natives of certain tribes who shoot little balls of coca leaves in their nostrils to experience a loss of conscience and, they claim, a fusion with God. Likewise, I don't believe those who enjoy voodoo, and dance in trance covered by the blood of slaughtered chickens should be put in a psychiatric ward. All these manifestations are comparable and legitimate.
However, I do believe a precise criterion should be set to discern irrational and unfounded beliefs (religion and superstition) from staments based on verifiable evidence. Scientific and religious statements, cannot be put in the same baskets. And people should be educated to understand this in actual facts, not only in theory.
When Thomas suggests that the "respect for authority and tradition" in religion and science are comparable, his opinion appears a bit simplistic in my opinion and dangerous from a cultural point of view.
While one may recognise that in any cultural setting tradition exercises a form of resistance against the breakage of established views, this 'resistance' is not the same at all in religion and in science.
In science it is exactly the breaking of traditions that allows progress: there are no dogmas deemed as absolute. Conversely religion is all about dogmas: the existence of God to begin with. Then all the hierarchies of supernatural creatures and saints. Then the presumption (in Christianity) that the Bible - a book written thousands of years ago - is 'the word of God'. And then all the prescriptions contained in the Bible, often taken in a dogmatic way.
Thomas fails to see the gnoseological implications of the formidable mass of myths and superstition provided by religion, their operating as factors of stagnation, prejudice and gullability, in that proof is considered not necessary. A tradition that extolls blind faith and obedience to dogmas without proof cannot be compared to a tradition animated by the scientific method. It is at its antipodes.
I think Thomas appears to be driven by the preoccupation of blurring the incommensurable difference between religious thinking (and consequently any type of irrational belief and/or superstition) and the Enlightenment to maintain an intact space of plausibility and reasonability for something (religion) that shrivels inesorably under the attacks of reason. By trying to equate religion to science, he appears to pursue a strategy of 'survival' for religion.
But in nothing religion and Enlightenment are comparable. One is based on void fabrications without proof, the other expresses the need to prove any statement with repeatable and verifiable evidence.
The ironic thing is that the religious mindset could be considered an ancient evolutionary step in the human search of knowledge. In an ancient past, it was the need of answers and control to lead the first primitive men to come out with an idea of gods. Not knowing anything, they used their imagination to fill the gaps of their ignorance. The underlying sense of primitive religions is the same as that of modern science: explaining reality in order to control it.
Nowadays the religious mindset, which tenaciously survived for reasons foreign to the plausibility of its tenets, is still fundamentally like the original one. It represents the persistence of prehistory. It is an example of persisting 'Jurassic' mental habit.
The Enlightenment has very clearly expressed that the need of knowlege - which was present even in ancient religions - must follow precise steps to be reliable. It is a question of proper method of reasoning, not a matter of ideology.
Surely, the desire to avoid fallacious thought and false opinions cannot be called ideological!If this core point about Enlightenment is not properly understood, a door remains dangerously open for arbitrariness, dogmatism, confusion and gullability. Any time, anybody with some charisma can even invent new religion: they don't have to prove anything, and people will just rely on visceral feelings to accept this or that.
In a society where the religious mindset still rages, fear, weakness, superstition, idolatry and gullibility can be exploited in unimaginable ways. Presidents start wars because "god told them to". And proving the evidence of WMD is not necessary: one can have faith in the president guided by God! Books are censored, and people confuse true science with superstition and mythology.
Thomas appears to wish to maintain a door open for metaphysics. At an individual level that cannot be denied. But at a cultural, scientific, educational and political level it is utterly dangerous and wrong.
Joe, I'm curious. Are you talking about "evidence" in a sense that is relevant to some, all or none of the following statements? (I ask because I have a hard time seeing how "Enlightenment" can settle these issues if it must do so on verifiable scientific evidence.)
Women should wear veils in public.
Women shoudl be strongly encouraged to do so.
Women should not wear veils at work.
Women should think for themselves.
Women can't think for themselves.
Women should wear miniskirts in public.
Women should at least be allowed to do so.
Women should not wear miniskirts at work.
The sight of a woman's face can affect a man in strange ways.
The sight of a woman's legs can affect a man in strange ways.
Men generally like to see women undress(ed).
Men shouldn't always get what they want.
Women have a tendency to cover themselves or expose themselves according to what men want.
Fashions change.
The state of fashion is a function of the moral condition of a culture.
Some styles are a species of shelter, others promise more.
There are clothes that hide, and clothes that bind.
There are clothes that indicate a negative capability.
There are clothes that say take me now.
Throughout history men have dressed women up in various ways as they please, putting words in their mouths.
There are scientific arguments for the suitability of some clothes to some contexts.
Veils are good for women.
Veils are bad for women.
Chicks look great in leather.
Etc.
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