wittgenstein, the tractatus

Boy, was I wrong (about the Tractatus not insisting on a clear distinction between thought and language). Section 3 has a lot to say about this. For instance:


3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.

3.11 We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation. The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition.


And yet . . . I don't feel convinced. I feel that Wittgenstein's project, even in the Tractatus, pulls the rug out from under the possibility of making a clear thought/language distinction. In other words, a part of me feels that Wittgenstein is doing something Derrida and the poststructuralists would later pick up on, that he's using a set of tools which x worldview makes possible in order to show that x worldview is untenable. But clearly the burden of proof is on me.