more wittgenstein

Well, ok, here's a first take . . .

For a moment, let's ignore 3.1, "In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses."

Consider the following:

3.11 We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation. The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition.

3.5 A propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought.

4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.


Admittedly, I've taken these out of context and could/should have included more, but the sketch of language/thought that seems to emerge here is that thought consists of "thinking the sense" of propositions -- i.e., picturing possible states of affairs (propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs). The question, then, is can we picture possible states of affairs without using language to do so? Maybe so, according to 3.1. Maybe we picture them first then find expressions for those pictures. But it also seems possible to me that 3.1 might be making a weaker claim, that it might in fact, mean little more than "propositions are by definition thinkable; if it isn't thinkable, it doesn't qualify as a proposition."

It seems to me that part of the difficulty is that Wittgenstein speaks of "thought" in two pretty different ways. In the first, "thought" pre-exists language and uses it as a tool for expression (3.1). In the second, "thought" is merely the "making sense" or "picturing" of propositions. In the first, thought takes ontological priority, whereas in the second, language does . . .